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Preirial Identification Procedures-Wade to Gilbert
to StovalI: Lower Courts Bobble the Ball
I. INTRODUCTION
In numerous criminal cases, an eyewitness to a crime will be
asked by the police to make art identification of a suspect. The
method of presentation of the suspect to the eyewitness will be
by one of three identification procedures: (a) a lineup-presen-
tation of the suspect in a group;' (b) a showup-presentation of
the suspect alone,2 or (c) a photograph-presentation of the sus-
pect.by photograph singly or with a group of other photographs
for possible identification. Any one or a combination of these
procedures may be used by the police to obtain a pretrial identi-
fication of the suspect. If the suspect is identified by the eye-
witness as the criminal, testimony by the witness concerning the
pretrial identification will usually be offered into evidence. The
eyewitness will also be asked at trial to make an in-court iden-
tification of the suspect. This testimony will obviously be highly
damaging to the suspect. He will be pointed out by the eyewit-
ness to the court as the perpetrator of the crime. A mistake in
identity by the eyewitness could be catastrophic to an innocent
suspect. Numerous cases of mistaken identification, however, by
an eyewitness Which resulted in subsequent erroneous convictions
have been extensively catalogued 3
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court in a trilogy of
cases-United States v. Wade,4 Gilbert v. California" and Stovall
1. P. WALL, EYE:-WiTNEss IIDEN cAuioN iN CRnvhNAL CASES 40(1965).
2. Id. at 28.
3. See generally E. BoRaCHAR, CoNvxcTrNG THE ImocENT (1932);
J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GumTY (1957); E. GARwm, Tun CounT OF
LAst RESORT, (1954); Q. Rkzvoms, Counmoom (1950); G. WILLAms, TnE
PRO6F or GUtLT (3rd ed. 1963).
4. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Several weeks after Wade's arrest on a
federal charge of bank robbery, the FBI, without notice to his appointed
counsel, had Wade appear in a lineup for possible identification by two
bank employees. Both witnesses identified Wade at the lineup, and at
trial they both made hi-court identifications.
5. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Sixteen days after his indictment for
aggravated robbery and murder, Gilbert, without notice to his ap-
pointed counsel, appeared in a lineup in a Los Angeles auditorium
before more than 100 witnesses. Several witnesses who had previously
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v. Denno 6-recognized the "dangers inherent in eyewitness iden-
tification and the suggestibility inherent in the context of the
pretrial identification." 7 In the Court's opinion, a suggestive pre-
trial identification procedure could lead to mistaken identifica-
tion which, in turn, could taint any subsequent in-court identifi-
cation of the suspect by the eyewitness. 8 Therefore, to avert any
prejudice to a suspect because of a suggestive pretrial identifica-
tion procedure and to provide for meaningful confrontation of
the eyewitness at trial through cross-examination, the Court in
Wade and Gilbert held that the pretrial identification procedure
after indictment9 was-a "critical stage" of the prosecution which,
under the sixth amendment, required the presence of counsel.' 0
In Stovall, the Wade and Gilbert decisions were given pro-
spective application." In addition, Stovall recognized another
ground of attack upon a conviction independent of the sixth
amendment right to counsel. If the procedure used in the pre-
trial identification "was so unnecessarily suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable mistaken identification," due process of law
would have been denied to the accused.12  The Court indicated
that any claimed violation of due process in the procedure of the
observed Gilbert in that lineup, later made in-court identifications of
him at trial.
6. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). For a discussion of the material facts in
Stovall see page 783 infra.
7. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
8. Id. at 228-29. "Moreover, 'it is a matter of common experi-
ence that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-up,
he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the
issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for
practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.'"
Id. at 229, quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades,
1963 CaRim. L. REv. (Eng.) 479, 482.
9. Most courts have held that the doctrine of Wade-Gilbert was
not limited to post-indictment identification procedures. See, e.g., In re
Holley, - R.I. -, 268 A.2d 723 (1970). For a discussion of the pre-
indictment exception used by some courts see Quinn, In the Wake of
Wade: The Dimensions of the Eyewitness Identification Cases, 42 COLO.
L. REv. 135, 143-44 (1970).
10. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1967). Wade and
Gilbert involved lineups, Stovall a showup. For an argument for the
application of the right to counsel at photo identifications see Comment,
43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1019 (1968). The Court, however, noted that the right
to counsel could be waived by the suspect. 388 U.S. at 237.
11. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-301 (1967).
12. Id. at 301-02. The Court cited as authority for this proposi-
tion, Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966), which found a voice
identification to be so unnecessarily suggestive as to violate due proc-
ess of law.
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pretrial identification would depend upon the "totality of the cir-
cumstances."'13
To assure respect by law enforcement officials of the consti-
tutional right to counsel, the Court in Wade and Gilbert formu-
lated a dual approach to the admission of evidence. Testimony
by the eyewitness concerning a pretrial identification conducted
without counsel or in violation of due process would be inadmis-
sible per se because it was "the direct result of the illegal lineup
'come at by exlfloitation of [the primary] illegality."'14 An in-
court identification of the suspect at trial by the eyewitness
would also be inadmissible unless the prosecution could prove by
"dear and convincing" evidence that the identification, rather
than stemming from the pretrial confrontation, had an inde-
pendent origin 15 or the appellate court could decide that the error
in its admission was harmless.'8  Most subsequent lower court
decisions have applied this dual approach by analogy to a viola-
tion of due process under Stovall. 17
Stovall provided lower courts with no precise guidelines to
follow in their examination of possible violations of due process
in pretrial identification procedures. Wade, however, did provide
examples of factors to be considered for the establishment of an
13. Id. at 302. The Court in Stovall decided that on the facts of the
case due process had not been violated.
14. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967), quoting Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
15. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1967).
16. Id. The Court cited Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
as the leading case for the "harmless error" doctrine. In Chapman, the
Court held that before constitutional error can be held to be harmless,
the Court must be able to declare its belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 21-24. In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250 (1969), however, the Court, in an apparent departure from this
standard, indicated that an error would be harmless when the untainted
evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. Id. at 254. In
his dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that Chapmana had been over-
ruled by the majority opinion in Harrington, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969)
(dissent).
17. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir.
1968); In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 449, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1969);
People v. Caruso, 68 Cal. 2d 183, 436 P.2d 336, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1968);
People v. Blumenshine, 42 Il. 2d 508, 250 N.E.2d 152 (1969); Coleman v.
State, 8 Md. App. 65, 258 A.2d 42 (1969); People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d
256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 299 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1969); People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d
600, 233 N.E.2d 103, 286 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967). But see Clemons v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The court in Clemons refused to
give the Gilbert per se exclusionary rule retrospective operation for
due process in a case where the pretrial confrontation occurred before
the Stovall decision,
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independent basis for an in-court identification. 18 This Note will
first survey the application of the Stovall rule by the lower
courts in the examination of showup and lineup procedures for
violations of substantive due process; 19 second, it will examine
the factors which the lower courts, upon finding a violation of
due process, have considered to establish by "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence an independent source sufficient to allow admis-
sion of an in-court identification of the suspect by the eyewitness
or in the finding of harmless error in the admission of the in-
court identification; finally, it will suggest and examine proce-
dures which, though arguably not required by the constitu-
tional right to due process, would aid in removal of the "dangers
inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility in-
herent in the context of the pretrial identification. '20
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. SHOWUPS
A showup-the presentation of a suspect alone to an eye-
witness for possible identification-has been called "the most
grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by
the police."' 2 1 The Wade Court, in a discussion of the showup in
Stovall, stated that it was difficult "to imagine a situation more
clearly conveying the suggestion to the witnesses that the one
presented is believed guilty by the police. ' 22 In a showup, there-
fore, "[Ihe message is quite clear: the police suspect this
man. ' 23  Showup procedures, consequently, have been severely
attacked by commentators and courts as unduly suggestive.2 4
18. Examples of these factors would be,[t]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the
existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description
and the defendant's actual description, any identification prior
to the lineup of another person, the identification by picture of
the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defend-
ant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the
alleged act and the lineup identification.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
19. Pretrial identification through the use of photographs will not
be considered in detail. For a recent discussion of photographic identi-
fications see Comment, 56 IowA L. Rxv. 408 (1970).
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
21. P. WALL, supra note 1, at 28.
22. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967).
23. Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 407 (1968) (dissenting opin-
ion).
24. "The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the
purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely
condemned." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See aZso Note,
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When a showup has been used by the police for identification
purposes, the right of the accused to due process of law may,
therefore, automatically have been violated because of the in-
herent suggestiveness of the procedure.
1. No violation of Substantive Due Process
Courts have been reluctant to find a violation of due process
in a showup when, in the court's opinion, compelling circum-
stances dictated a showup, efficient law enforcement and "fresh"
identification required an on-the-scene identification or external
factors "proved" the accuracy of the identification.
a. Compelling Circumstances
The facts in Stovall provided an example of the compelling
circumstances held necessary by the Court to justify a suggestive
showup. In Stovall the victim was hospitalized for multiple stab
wounds. The defendant was taken in handcuffs to the hospital
bedside of the victim, whose survival was uncertain. The de-
fendant, the only Negro in the room, was identified by her as the
assailant after she had been asked by a police officer whether
he "was the man," and after the defendant, at the request of an
officer, repeated several words for voice identification. Under
the "totality of the circumstances" the confrontation, in the opin-
ion of the Court was considered justified because it was impera-
tive that the victim identify her assailant while she was still able
to do so. 25 No alternative identification procedure was readily
and reasonably available.
Due Process Considerations in Police Showup Practices, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 377, 392 (1969); Comment, 14 VL. L. REv. 535, 540 (1969).
25. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). The Court stated:
Here was the only person in the world who could possibly ex-
onerate Stovall. Her words, and only her words "He is not the
man" could have resulted in freedom for Stovall. The hospital
was not far distant from the courthouse and jail. No one knew
how long [the witness] might live. Faced with the responsi-
bility of identifying the attacker, with the need for immediate
action and with the knowledge that [the witness] could not
visit the jail, the police followed the only feasible procedure and
took Stovall to the hospital room. Under these circumstances,
the usual police station line-up, which Stovall now argues he
should have had, was out of the question.
Id. Accord, People v. Riveria, 22 N.Y.2d 453, 239 N.E.2d 873, 293 N.Y.S.
2d 271 (1968); Commonwealth v. Dessus, 214 Pa. Super. 347, 257 A.2d
867 (1969) (the victim identified two of the group of three presented
to her as the assailants). But see People v. Riveria, 22 N.Y.2d 453,
455, 239 N.E.2d 873, 874, 293 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
In Riveria the defendant was taken to a hospital to be identified by a
gravely wounded witness. Another witness was taken to the hospital
19711
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b. On-the-Scene
Alternative identification procedures are more reasonably
available for on-the-scene showups. These showups, however,
have been held not to violate due process when the defendant was
quickly apprehended and returned to the scene of the crime.20
Two reasons have been expressed by the courts for refusal to
find a violation of due process: the ensurance of fresh, accurate
identification 27 and the need for efficient law enforcement. 28
Bates v. United States29 advanced both theories in an opinion
by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger. In Bates, a housebreaker
was apprehended by police within thirty minutes after the com-
mission of the crime. After the defendant was returned to the
scene, the victim identified him while he sat alone in a patrol
wagon. Judge Burger noted that "police action in returning
the suspect to the vicinity of the crime for immediate identifica-
tion ... fosters the desirable objectives of fresh, accurate iden-
tification which in some instances may lead to immediate release
to make an identification. Judge Fuld, in his dissent, stated that this
second identification was the kind of technique condemned by the New
York courts. Id.
26. The sixth amendment right to counsel under Wade and Gil-
bert has not been generally applied in on-the-scene identifications. See,
e.g., Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 928 (1969). For further discussion see Comment, Right to Coun-
sel at Scene-of-the-crime Identifications, 117 U. PA. L. Rmv. 916 (1969).
27. See, e.g., Harris v. Dees, 421 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1970); Stewart
v. United States, 418 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Russell v. United States,
408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); Young v.
United States, 407 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1007
(1969); Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968); Sears v. Siegler, 298 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Neb.
1969); People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 118, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1969);
People v. Lynch, 111 Ill. App. 2d 52, 249 N.E.2d 649 (1969); Grant v. State,
466 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1969); People v. Ambrosoli, 33 App. Div. 2d 881, 307
N.Y.S.2d 785 (1969); Martin v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 686, 173 S.E.2d
794 (1970); Johnson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 13, 176 N.W.2d 332 (1970).
28. See, e.g., Harris v. Dees, 421 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1970); Stewart
v. United States, 418 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wise v. United States,
383 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968); United
States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Colgain,
276 Cal. App. 2d 118, 80 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1969); People v. Lynch, 111 Ill.
App. 2d 52, 249 N.E.2d 649 (1969); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass
494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1034 (1969); Grant v.
State, 446 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1969); People v. Ambrosoli, 33 App. Div. 2d
881, 307 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1969); Martin v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 686, 173
S.E.2d 794 (1970); Johnson v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 13, 176 N.W.2d 332 (1970).
29. 405 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The soundness of any on-the-
scene identification has been questioned. Quinn, In the Wake of Wade:
the Dimensions of the Eyewitness Identification Cases, 42 CoLo. L. REv.
135, 144-47 (1970).
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of an innocent suspect and at the same time enable the police to
resume the search for the fleeing culprit while the trail is
fresh."3 0 Under the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding
the confrontation, any prejudice to the defendant through the
suggestive on-the-scene showup was considered by the court to
be outweighed by the freshness of the identification and the
necessity for efficient police investigative techniques. 31
These two justifications for on-the-scene identifications have
been used to support additional suggestive procedures during the
identification. Although requiring a suspect to don clothing sim-
ilar to the perpetrator of the crime or clothing worn by the crim-
inal in an on-the-scene showup aggravates an already suggestive
situation,3" two decisions-Caruso v. United States33 and Young
v. United States34-have refused to find those circumstances any
more suggestive or less reliable.
In Caruso the defendant was apprehended and returned
within fifteen minutes to the scene of the bank robbery. He was
required to wear a ski hood that had been dropped at the scene of
the crime. He was then identified by three witnesses. In the
court's opinion the confrontation was neither suggestive nor con-
ducive to mistaken identification because the confrontation took
place fifteen minutes after the robbery, requiring a suspect to
wear an article of clothing does not violate due process33 and
the suspect was otherwise distinctively garbecL3
In Young the defendant was arrested and returned to the
scene within a few minutes of the robbery. The victim was un-
able to identify the suspect until the defendant had put on his
own hat, trenchcoat and sunglasses. The court said that "oblig-
ing appellant to don his own apparel did not make the re-
sulting identification less reliable; indeed, in the circumstances
it is doubtful whether a reliable identification could have been
made in the absence of the robber's distinctive accounter-
ments. 37
30. Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
31. Id.
32. P. WALL, supra note 1, at 32.
33. 406 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
34. 407 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1007 (1969).
35. For a discussion of the use of distinctive clothing in lineups
see notes 171-181 infra and accompanying text.
36. Caruso v. United States, 406 F.2d 558, 559 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
37. Young v. United States, 407 F.2d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1007 (1969). But see People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600,
233 NXE.2d 103, 286 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967) (exhibition of defendant in his
19711
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Neither case required an on-the-scene identification under
the reasons advanced by the courts for justification of such a
showup. Fresh identification was not essential. In Caruso the
ski hood would have prevented identification by facial features-
only memories of the robber's build and dress would fade. Be-
cause of the distinctive dress of the robber, however, the wit-
nesses easily identified the clothing worn by the defendant when
arrested as the clothing worn by one of the holdup men when
the clothing was introduced at trial.38 In Young the witness ad-
mitted he could not identify the defendant until he saw him
dressed in clothing similar to that worn by the holdup man.39
Nor did efficient law enforcement require an immediate
identification in either case. The defendant in Caruso was pur-
sued after the robbery by a bank employee until the arresting
officer continued the chase.40 In Young the suspect matched
the clothing and physical description given by the victim. Fur-
ther, $181 including a $2 bill had been taken by a man with a
chrome-plated revolver during the crime. When the defendant
was arrested, he had in his pocket $181 including a $2 bill and a
toy revolver. 41 In light of these facts, there was little likelihood
of police error in the arrest of an innocent party in Caruso and
Young.
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test fashioned by
the Court, the compelling circumstances in Stovall justified a
showup. Bates, in applying the same test, concluded that due
process was not violated by an on-the-scene showup which as-
sured fresh memory and efficient law enforcement. Caruso and
Young extended the "totality" test to allow, without a violation
of due process, on-the-scene showups which were necessitated
heavy coat and glasses before the witness could identify him was a
factor in the finding of a violation of due process); State v. Cooper, 14
Ohio Misc. 173, 237 N.E.2d 653 (C.P. 1968) (display of defendant in his
hat, glasses and trenchcoat seized in an unlawful search condemned).
Under the facts of Young, it could be argued that it was doubtful
whether any identification could have been made in the absence of the
robber's "distinctive accouterments." Query whether Young or the
clothing was identified. Young and Bates were decided by the same
court. It may be that Young has extended the Bates rationale.
38. Caruso v. United States, 406 F.2d 558, 559 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
39. Young v. United States, 407 F.2d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1007 (1969).
40. Caruso v. United States, 406 F.2d 558, 559 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
41. Young v. United States, 407 F.2d 720-21 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 1007 (1969).
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neither by fresh memory, efficient law enforcement nor com-
pelling circumstances. This extention finds little support in
either Stovall or Bates. In Bates, Judge Burger expressed his
opinion that "prudent police work could confine these on-the-
scene identifications to situations in which possible doubts as
to identification needed to be resolved promptly; absent such
need the conventional line-up viewing is the appropriate proce-
dure."42 In both cases lineups, properly conducted, would have
been far less suggestive. "With the stakes so high, due process
does not permit second best."'4 3 Caruso and Young, however, al-
lowed "second best" police procedures to pass without comment.
c. External Factors
Under the Wade-Gilbert-Stovafl decisions, once a suspect's
right to counsel or due process at a pretrial identification has
been violated, in-court identification by the identifying witness
would be inadmissible unless an "independent source" for that
identification were established or unless it were established that
the error in its admission was harmless.44 The Court in Wade
provided examples of the external factors that could be used to
establish an "independent source" for the in-court identifica-
tion.45 Many courts, however, have not used the external factors
to determine the existence of an "independent source" which
would justify the in-court identification, even though there had
been a denial of pretrial due process. Rather, these factors have
been considered by the courts as additional "proof" of the accur-
acy of the pretrial identification. 40 Because the pretrial identifi-
cation in the courts' opinion was correct, due process, therefore,
had not been denied to the suspect.47
42. Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
43. Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (1968) (dissent-
ing opinion). It should be noted that Judge Bazelon, in his dissent in
Wright, stated that a violation of due process occurred whenever the
police unjustifiably failed to hold a lineup. Later, in Young, Bazelon
acquiesced in a per curiam opinion. Apparently the showup in Young,
in Bazelon's opinion, was justifiable or he has changed his attitude
toward showups.
44. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text. The lower
courts' approach to "independent source" and "harmless error" will be
discussed later. See notes 195-219 infra and accompanying text
45. See note 17 supra.
46. See, e.g., State v. Carnegie, 158 Conn. 264, 259 A.2d 628 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 992 (1969).
47. It has been argued that court consideration of external factors
to justify a showup cannot be supported by the Stovall decision. See
Note, Due Process Considerations in Police Showup Practices, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 377, 383 (1969).
1971]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
When the pretrial identification occurred soon after the
crime, the courts' approach to external factors was also supported
by the fresh identification and efficient law enforcement consid-
erations used by the courts to justify the on-the-scene showups. 48
Other cases have alluded to the necessity for fresh identification
and efficient law enforcement by their emphasis upon the brief
lapse of time between the criminal act and the pretrial identifi-
cation."49 The brief lapse of time coupled with factors such as an
accurate description of the criminal or the getaway car,50 oppor-
tunity to view the criminal during the crime,"' adequate illumi-
nation of the scene of the crime 52 and other incriminating evi-
dence, 53 in the courts' opinion, have outweighed any prejudice
to the suspect.
The arguments advanced by the courts in the on-the-scene
showups 54 lose their force with the longer passage of time be-
tween the pretrial identification and the commission of the
48. See State v. Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377 (1969);
State v. Gatling, 5 N.C. App. 536, 169 S.E.2d 60 (1969). See notes 26-43
supra and accompanying text for the discussion of arguments in sup-
port of on-the-scene showups.
49. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3rd 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 608 (1970) (two and one-half hours after the crime); People v.
Burns, 270 Cal. App. 2d 238, 75 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1969) (shortly after
the crime); People v. Romero, 263 Cal. App. 2d 590, 69 Cal. Rptr. 748
(1968) (one-half hour after the crime); Asber v. State, - Del. -, 253
A.2d 204 (Super. Ct. 1969) (one and one-half hours after the crime);
People v. Moore, 43 Ill. 2d 102, 251 N.E.2d 181 (1969) (shortly after the
crime); People v. James, 109 I1l. App. 2d 328, 248 N.E.2d 777 (1969)
(shortly after the crime); State v. Sanders, 202 Kan. 551, 451 P.2d 148
(1969) (one hour after the crime); Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 23, 249
A.2d 732 (1969) (two and one-half hours after the crime); Common-
wealth v. Blackburn, 354 Mass. 200, 237 N.E.2d 35 (1968) (evening of the
crime); State v. Sears, 182 Neb. 384, 155 N.W.2d 332 (1967) (two and
one-half to three hours after the crime).
50. See, e.g., People v. Burns, 270 Cal. App. 2d 238, 75 Cal. Rptr. 688
(1969); People v. Romero, 263 Cal. App. 2d 590, 69 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Blackburn, 354 Mass. 200, 237 N.E.2d 35 (1968); State
v. Sears, 182 Neb. 384, 155 N.W.2d 332 (1967).
51. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 263 Cal. App. 2d 590, 69 Cal. Rptr.
748 (1968); People v. James, 109 Ill. App. 2d 328, 248 N.E.2d 777 (1969);
Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 23, 249 A.2d 732 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Blackburn, 354 Mass. 200, 237 N.E.2d 35 (1968).
52. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 43 Ill. 2d 102, 251 N.E.2d 181 (1969);
Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 23, 249 A.2d 732 (1969).
53. See, e.g., People v. Burns, 270 Cal. App. 2d 238, 75 Cal. Rptr.
688 (1969); People v. James, 109 Ill. App. 2d 328, 248 N.E.2d 777 (1969);
State v. Sanders, 202 Kan. 551, 451 P.2d 148 (1969). But when the police
have ample evidence for a possible conviction, no efficiency would be
lost by the use of a lineup, and the suspect would not be prejudiced
by a suggestive showup.
54. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
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crime.5 5 Fresh memory may be valid when the pretrial identifi-
cation occurred within a few hours of the crime, but when that
identification did not occur until days after the crime, little va-
lidity can be found in the argument. Efficient law enforcement
required no quick identification of a suspect. In most cases the
suspect was already in jail. Lineups, apparently, could have
been arranged with little effort.50 Courts, however, have been
reluctant to find a violation of due process even though other
grossly suggestive facts are added to a prolonged period of time
between the crime and the pretrial identification:
We think it plain that the totality of attendant circumstances
show that the confrontation here was fraught with hazards of
serious unfairness. It was strongly suggestive and conducive
to mistaken identification to summon the victims to the pre-
cinct to view a suspect twenty days after the robbery and
present them with a single Negro in obvious custody of a white
policeman when the victims had previously described the cul-
prit as a Negro. The situation, without more, clearly conveyed
the suggestion that the Negro presented was believed by the
police to be the culprit. The vice was heightened by the vic-
tims' identification of the suspect in each other's presence, and
the opportunity for objective observation was destroyed by ex-
citing the victims' imagination when the suspect, still alone
without others for image and voice comparison, donned the cul-
prit's pork pie hat and spoke his words, 'Where's the money?"
The spotlight of suggestion could hardly be focused with
greater intensity than it was here.57
The court concluded, however, that the tainted showup had not
affected competent witnesses and the prosecution had established
an "independent source" for the in-court identification."5
55. But see United States ex rel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F.2d
217 (2d Cir. 1968) (identification eleven days after the crime); State v.
Hill, 419 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1967) (identification seven days after the crime).
56. But see People v. Floyd, 15 Mich. App. 284, 166 N.W.2d 506
(1968). The jail rarely had sufficient prisoners, especially Negroes, to
have a lineup. The use of a group of photographs would have been
preferred to a showup. P. WArzt, EYE-Wrn, ss IDnNICATioN nr CmRI-
NAL CAsEs 72 (1965).
57. United States ex reL Geralds v. Deegan, 292 F. Supp. 968, 973(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (footnotes omitted). See also United States ex reL
James v. Follette, 301 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) where two months
after the crime the witness could not identify the suspect at the
scene of the crime in a showup until the suspect had washed his face,
combed his hair, donned clothing described as being worn during the
crime and uttered words used during the crime; People v. Bey, 42 IlM.
2d 139, 246 N.E.2d 287 (1968) where the witness identified the suspect
two days after a rape by his voice and the configuration of his head.
No mention of this unusual fact had been made in the original descrip-
tion of the criminal
58. United States ex rel. Geralds v. Deegan, 292 F. Supp. 968, 974(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Under this decision it would be difficult to see how
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The Court in Wade suggested several factors that could be
used by the lower courts to establish an "independent source" for
an in-court identification after a violation of the suspect's right
to due process of law. These lower courts, however, have errone-
ously seized upon those external factors as support for a failure to
find a due process violation. The decision in Stovall will not sup-
port that approach. In Stovall the Court stated that a violation
of due process should be measured by the "totality of the circum-
stances" surrounding the confrontation. If those circumstances
were unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to mistake, due
process would be violated. Indeed, showups were condemned by
the Court as unnecessarily suggestive, but in certain instances
the Court, under the "totality" test, has allowed the use of a show-
up. These lower courts go well beyond the Court's application of
the "totality" test. In the opinion of those courts, a, showup may
be used any time if external factors lead to the conclusion that
the identification was correct.
The decisions have also circumvented the evidentiary rules
established by the Court by their allowance of testimony at trial
by the eyewitness concerning the pretrial identification and their
failure to shift the burden of proof to the prosecution to estab-
lish the "independent source" for an in-court identification by
"clear and convincing" evidence. The evidentiary rules were for-
mulated by the Court to assure respect by law enforcement offi-
cials for the suspect's right to due process. These decisions,
however, protect only the due process rights of those suspects
who, in the court's opinion, are innocent. If "competent" wit-
nesses give an identification that "seems accurate" no matter how
suggestive the confrontation might have been, the suspect's right
to due process goes unprotected. In other words, anything goes
as long as he's guilty: an attitude which does little to insure
proper respect by law enforcement officials for constitutional
rights. It has no support in the Stovall decision or in the spirit
in which that decision was rendered.
2. Violation of Substantive Due Process
a. New York Rule
The New York approach to a showup and due process viola-
tions has been markedly different. Showups apparently have
there could ever be a violation of due process if the police have com-
petent witnesses. This competency could be used by the court to negate
the most suggestive pretrial identification.
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been viewed, absent imperative circumstances, as violations of
due process. 59 Although this rule has not been specifically
adopted, the thrust of the opinions has indicated a preference for
an initial finding- of a violaton of due process in a showup. Any
testimony by the. eyewitness at trial concerning the pretrial iden-
tification has then been inadmissible per se and the burden of
proof for the establishment of an "independent source" to support
an in-court identification by the eyewitness then has been shifted
to the prosecution.
In People v. Brown,6 0 the witness, through a small window,
viewed and identified two Negro suspects as they sat with a
white policeman in another room. The concurring opinion stated
that "absent 'imperative' circumstances . .. [the showup] can
be 'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
take' as to amount to a denial of due process."8 1 The court, how-
ever, affirmed the conviction because there was no prejudice to
the defendant in the identification.6 2
Later, in'People v. Ballott s the victim identified the de-
fendant in a showup one year after the crime after the defendant
had, itlherrequest, dressed in a hat and heavy coat and spoken
words similar to-those used in the crime. The court did not find
on the record an "independent source" for the in-court identifica-
tion by the eyewitness. Because of the violation of due process
during .the pretrial identification procedure, the conviction was
reversed and remanded. At the new trial the court said that an
in-court identification would be allowed only if the prosecution
established at a hearing to be held by the judge out of the pres-
ence of the jury the independent basis for the in-court identifica-
tion of the suspect by clear and convincing proof.0 4 New York
59. The courts have not provided a definition for "imperative cir-
cumstances."
60. 20 N.Y.2d 238, 229 N.E.2d 192, 282 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1967). The
constitutionality of any showup has been questioned. See, e.g., Com-
ment, 14 VinL. L. REv. 535, 543 (1969).
61. 20 N.Y.2d at 243-44, 229 N.E.2d at 194, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 501
(1967).
62. Id. The concurring opinion stated that the introduction into
evidence of the impermissible pretrial identification was harmless error
because the victim had ample opportunity to view the defendant before
and during the crime. Id. at 244, 229 N.E.2d at 195, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
On facts similar to Brown the court simply found a violation of due
process and remanded to see if the in-court identification had been
tainted. People v. Hill, 22 N.Y.2d 686, 238 N.E.2d 913, 291 N.Y.S.2d 802
.(1968).
63. 20 N.Y.2d 600, 233 NXE.2d 103, 286 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
64. Id. at 607, 233 N.E.2d at 107, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
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cases since Ballott have found the failure to employ a lineup by
the police, absent imperative circumstances, violative of due proc-
ess with little or no discussion of the facts of each case.05
Dissenting opinions in two other jurisdictions have expressed
similar views. In Commonwealth v. Choice0 the dissent would
have found a due process violation because an unnecessary show-
up had been used.07 In Wright v. United States 8 Judge Bazelon
felt that due process was violated whenever the police unjust-
ifiably failed to hold a lineup. 9
Bazelon's dissent in Wright has apparently been partially
followed in McRae v. United States.70 In McRae four hours
after a rape, the defendant was taken by the police to the victim
at a hospital for possible showup identification. The victim
walked from the emergency room of the hospital to the police
car where she identified the Negro defendant as he sat in the
back seat with a white policeman. The court found that there
was no evidence that the victim was likely to die or that her con-
dition would prevent her attendance at a proper lineup. The
court stated:
[A]t some point the nexus of time and place between offense
and identification must become too attenuated to outweigh the
admitted dangers of presenting suspects singly to witnesses.
We conclude that this point was reached, and more, in this
case.
71
Although, in the opinion of the court, the showup was "unneces-
sarily suggestive," this did not "automatically imply that it
65. See, e.g., People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 299
N.Y.S.2d 830 (1969); People v. Hill, 22 N.Y.2d 686, 238 N.E.2d 913, 291
N.Y.S.2d 802 (1968); People v. Colabella, 31 App. Div. 2d 827, 298 N.Y.S.
2d 40 (1969). The in-court identification can still be admitted if it has
an "independent source," or its admission was "harmless error." People
v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d at 261 & n.1, 247 N.E.2d at 653 & n.1, 299 N.Y.S.2d
at 834 & n.1.
66. 211 Pa. Super. 176, 235 A.2d 173, 174 (1967) (dissenting opin-
ion). In Choice the defendant was shown to two witnesses who were
brought into an interrogation room and asked, "Is this the one?" The
majority found no violation of due process. Id.
67. Id. at 178, 235 A.2d at 175.
68. 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion). The
majority remanded the case for further findings of fact.
69. Id.
70. 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
71. Id. at 1290. But see Commonwealth v. Connolly, - Mass.
255 N.E.2d 191 (1970). The defendants in Connolly were identified by
the victim from a hospital bed. In the opinion of the court they were
not denied due process. The court stated, "[it was] immaterial whether
[witness'] wounds were so critical that haste, as in the Stovall case,
was essential if any identification at all was to occur .... " Id. at 196
(emphasis added).
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was so conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that the
appellant was denied due process."7 2 The case was remanded to
the district court because that court was better suited to decide
whether there was an independent source supporting the prob-
able reliability of the hospital confrontation that the circuit court
found unnecessarily suggestive.73
b. Flagrant Pretrial Confrontation
Some courts have found a violation of due process in the
face of a highly suggestive pretrial identification showup. In
State v. Cooper 74 a violation of due process was found upon a re-
view of all evidence so as to destroy the probative value of the
identification. In Cooper the police took four of the five wit-
nesses in a police cruiser to "identify Mr. Cooper." The defend-
ant was displayed to the group after the police had told the wit-
nesses that they "thought they had the right man." When two of
the witnesses failed to identify the suspect, he was made to put
on a hat and glasses, items that were the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizure. All of them subsequently identified him.
Two of the victims then gave statements to the police at head-
quarters in front of the suspect after again viewing him in a
trenchcoat, hat and glasses. In the opinion of the court:
Each of the five things the police did would in and of itself, be
grossly suggestive and likely to result in mistake. Together
their effect is crushing and in this case not a single one of
them was at all necessary to accomplish any legitimate police
purpose.7 5
In Coleman v. State76 the witness failed to identify the de-
72. McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
In an earlier case in the same court, however, Judge J. Skelly Wright
stated that an unnecessarily suggestive showup was a violation of due
process. Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See also People v. McMath, 45 Ill. 2d 33, 256 N.E.2d 835 (1970). The
court in McMath found the showup unnecessarily suggestive but not
so conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to be a violation
of due process. Id. at--, 256 N.E.2d at 837.
74. 14 Ohio Misc. 173, 237 N.E.2d 653 (C.P. 1968).
75. Id. at 175, 237 N.E.2d at 654. See also People v. King, 266
Cal. App. 2d 437, 464-66, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 496 (1968) where the court
found a suggestion by the police to the witness of their certainty of the
suspect's guilt too suggestive; United States v. Gilmore, 398 F.2d 679
(7th Cir. 1968) where the victim said after the crime that he could not
identify the criminal and then identified the defendant at a showup.
Under those circumstances the court in Gilmore found a violation of
due process. Id.
76. 8 Md. App. 65, 258 A.2d 42 (1969).
19711
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
fendant when she viewed him in a lineup. She had also viewed
a number of photographs of which she selected three other
men as possible suspects. The identification was finally posi-
tively made when the defendant was called forward and accused
of the crime at the preliminary hearing. After a finding of a vio-
lation of due process, the court reversed the conviction and re-
manded to see if the prosecution could establish an "independent
source" for an in-court identification by the eyewitness. 7
3. Summary
Few courts, in the interpretation of Stovall have found a vio-
lation of due process in the use of a showup. If the concept of
fairness which motivated the Court in Stovall to protect a sus-
pect's right to due process during a pretrial confrontation is
therefore to be applied, the New York approach to Stovall should
be followed by the lower courts. Showups, absent imperative
circumstances, should be a violation of due process. Imperative
circumstances should be limited to compelling circumstances and
on-the-scene showups. Beyond these circumstances pretrial iden-
tifications should be confined to lineups or identification through
the use of a photograph of the suspect presented with other
photographs of individuals similar in appearance. In addition,
testimony at trial concerning the pretrial identification in viola-
tion of due process should be excluded, and the burden of proof
for an in-court identification of the suspect by the witness based
on an "independent source" should be shifted to the prosecution.
Persistent use of a suggestive showup would be discouraged by
this approach while efficient law enforcement would be un-
harmed.
III. LINEUPS
The witness who views a lineup will have a minimum of two
people from which to make a possible identification. Ideally,
there should be at least six participants who closely resemble
each other in stature, clothing and physical characteristics. All
participants should be displayed to the witness simultaneously
with no undue attention being drawn to any of them. The wit-
ness may request the participants to repeat a statement or move-
ment made by the criminal to facilitate identification, but all
members of the lineup should be made to comply with this re-
quest to negate focusing on one participant, unless the witness
77. Id. at 78, 258 A.2d at 49.
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requests a specific lineup member to repeat the phrase or move-
ment. If there are several witnesses, each witness should convey
his conclusions to the police while isolated from the other wit-
nesses to avoid influencing the others' decisions.78
This identification procedure, although seemingly free from
influence, can still impart subtle suggestion and affect the wit-
ness' judgment and subsequent selection of a participant as "the
criminal." The witness may feel that the police would not ask
him to view a lineup unless they felt that they had the culprit.
He may also feel an obligation to reward the police for their effort
by selecting a participant as the "guilty party." The question in
the witness' mind may then become, "Which one of the partici-
pants is he?" rather than, "Is the criminal in the lineup?" In
light of these inherent influences, any suggestion which focuses
attention upon an individual within the lineup can affect the im-
partiality of the confrontation. Thus, it is imperative that the
lineup be conducted with the greatest care and diligence to assure
fundamental fairness and preserve due process.79
Stovall, although dealing with a showup, by analogy has
been applied to lineups.80 The Court in Stovall held that under
the "totality of the circumstances" the confrontation must not be
"so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identification" as to be a violation of due process. In for-
mal and informal lineup confrontations, one or more items may
be "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identification," but under the forgiving guise of the "to-
tality of the circumstances" surrounding the confrontation, the
courts are not forced to find a violation of due process. In prac-
tice the lower courts have seldom invalidated a lineup identifica-
tion because of one defect.
"Totality of the circumstances," when applied to lineups, ap-
pears to encompass both a consideration of external factors as in
the showup cases and a weighing process with respect to the char-
acteristics of the lineup itself, i.e., the unfair characteristics of the
confrontation are measured against the fair characteristics. The
subsections below which discuss the formal and informal lineup
confrontations in relation to the lower court decisions will, there-
78. See Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966
UTAn L. Rsv. 610, 627-28, cited in Wade, 388 U.S. 218 at 236 n.26.
79. P. WALL, supra note 56, at 40-41.
80. The Court in Stovall directed its attention to a violation of due
process in a confrontation and subsequent courts have interpreted this
to include lineups as well as showups.
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fore, be measured against the "unnecessarily suggestive" stand-
ard with the realization that most courts have not found a vio-
lation of due process after examining the "totality of the circum-
stances."
A. INFORMAL CONFRONTATIONS
Often a suspect will be identified while in an informal group
rather than in a formal lineup. This has occurred in the lobby of
the police station,8 ' in a police department office, 82 in a corridor
of the police station,8 in a courtroom,8 4 in a room designed for
viewing and identification8 5 or in a jail cell.80 Although this pro-
cedure is not subject to the inherent suggestiveness of a showup,
at least one authority feels that even this method is unfair.87
The suspect may unconsciously, by nervous actions, focus atten-
tion on himself during the secret observation. To prevent this
possible unfair suggestion, it has been suggested that the suspect
should be allowed a direct confrontation with his accuser to al-
low him to compose himself and disguise any fear he may have of
the proceedings. 88 Direct confrontation, which is required in
England, also would assure that the other participants, through
fear of the suspect when left alone with him, or otherwise, would
not inadvertently direct the witness' attention to the suspect.
An exception to direct confrontation should be allowed when
the witness would be too nervous to face his assailant. But even
then the suspect should be told when the unobserved witness is
viewing him.8 9
American courts have not concerned themselves with this
aspect of the pretrial identification procedure. In affirming the
81. Simon v. State, 7 Md. App. 446, 256 A.2d 348 (1969).
82. United States v. Gregg, 414 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Clark, 294 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Logan, 25
N.Y.2d 184, 250 N.E.2d 454, 303 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1969).
83. United States v. Gregg, 414 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1969); People v.
Logan, 25 N.Y.2d 184, 250 N.E.2d 454, 303 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1969).
84. Dade v. United States, 407 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United
States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Davis,
407 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1969).
85. State v. Brown, 104 Ariz. 510, 456 P.2d 368 (1969); People v.
Pelow, 24 N.Y.2d 161, 247 N.E.2d 150, 299 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1969); State v.
Nelson, 250 S.C. 6, 156 S.E.2d 341 (1967).
86. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 354 Mass. 598, 239 N.E.2d 5 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1056 (1969).
87. P. WALL, supra note 56, at 44-45.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 45-46.
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convictions, they have focused on the fact that the suspect wore
clothes similar to those worn by others in the room,0 was not
wearing handcuffs91 and no attempt was made to single out the
suspect for a witness. 92
When the Stovall standard of "unnecessarily suggestive" is
applied to an informal viewing, it would appear that this proce-
dure could be acceptable since any suggestion or influence must
come from the suspect himself. Indeed, it could be argued that
the suspect is seen in a more natural setting than the artificial
atmosphere of a police lineup. It would be difficult to imagine a
confrontation which would provide a more neutral setting than
that employed by the police in United States v. Clark03 The wit-
ness was requested to come to the Robbery Squad office to view
a suspect. When he arrived, the suspect was seated behind a de-
tective's desk talking on the telephone. He was neatly attired in
a manner similar to the others milling around the room. Despite
the fact that the witness did not expect to see the suspect in the
office and certainly not behind a desk using the telephone, he im-
mediately identified him. There certainly was no suggestive in-
fluence present in this confrontation.
Despite the possibility of fairness as evidenced in Clark,
proper standards of fairness could more easily be applied to a
lineup by the courts. An informal confrontation inititated by
the police, therefore, should not be preferred over a properly con-
ducted lineup.
B. FoRmAL CoNFRoNTATIoNs
There are a variety of subtle, suggestive influences on the
witness which may be present in a formal police lineup. These
may exist before, during or after the actual confrontation and
may be by design of the police or innocent in nature.
90. People v. Pelow, 24 N.Y.2d 161, 166, 247 N.E.2d 150, 152, 299
N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (1969); United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 651
(4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Clark, 294 F. Supp. 44, 48 (D.D.C. 1968).
But see People v. Logan, 25 N.Y.2d 184, 250 N.E.2d 454, 303 N.Y.S.2d
353 (1969), where the defendant was the only person in the room not
wearing a police uniform or business suit.
91. United States v. Davis, 407 F.2d 846, 847 (4th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 651 (4th Cir. 1968); State v. Galloway,
247 A2d 104, 108 (Me. 1968).
92. State v. Galloway, 247 A.2d 104, 108 (Me. 1968); Dade v. United
States, 407 F.2d 692, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State v. Brown, 104 Ariz. 510,
511, 456 P.2d 368, 369 (1969).
93. 294 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1968).
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1. Pre-lineup Suggestion
Before the actual lineup, it is possible for the authorities to
influence the witness by suggestive police statements, by a pre-
lineup photographic display, by a pre-lineup confrontation with
the suspect or other lineup participants or by multiple lineup
confrontations.
a. Police Statements
The witness' conviction that one of the participants in the
lineup is probably the criminal can be reinforced by a police
statement indicating the presence in the lineup of the "right
man." Apparently, however, the statement must be grossly un-
fair before an American court will reverse a conviction based on
a denial of due process. In Bradley v. Commonwealth, 4 a rob-
bery victim before viewing the lineup was told that "[a] 11 you
have to do is point him out. We know we got him."0 5  In the
court's opinion the lineup, under the "totality of the circum-
stances," was acceptable.9 6
The court concluded that the police, in United States v.
Mancusi,9 7 however, went too far. The victim of a purse snatch-
ing was requested to come to the police station one and one-half
months after the crime to view a suspect. After studying two
men standing outside their cell, she pointed to one, identifying
him as the purse snatcher. The officer then pointed to the other
man, stating, "No, it was him that took your money, wasn't it?"' 8
She agreed. The court affirmed the lower court's reversal of the
conviction as being based on an unreliable identification.9
Proper identification procedures should permit no indication
by the police as to whom the guilty party is when the witness
confronts the suspect in a lineup situation. Any such indication
before the lineup only places undue pressure upon the witness to
make an identification. The possibility of "irreparable mistake"
through unnecessary police suggestion is thereby needlessly
increased.
b. Photographic Display
The reliability of a witness' identification at a formal lineup
94. 439 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1969).
95. Id. at 64.
96. Id.
97. 409 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1969).
98. Id. at 802.
99. Id. at 803.
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can be eroded by allowing the witness to see a photograph of the
suspect, the suspect himself, or the innocent members of the
lineup in such a way that their innocence is displayed, prior to
the lineup observation. 100 A witness' attention will inevitably
be drawn to a familiar face in viewing the persons before him,
and, if he is in doubt, that face may be chosen.
The use of photographs, although subject to this condemna-
tion, is often a necessary procedure in the apprehension of a sus-
pect by the police. An identification of a suspect through the
use of "mug shots" frequently provides the authorities with their
only clue to a suspect's identity. On the other hand, identifica-
tion by a witness of a photograph before apprehension of the
criminal can influence the selection of that same person in a sub-
sequent lineup after apprehension because of the familiarity of
the features. Efficient law enforcement dictates that this risk
should be taken, however, when the photographic display may
possibly lead to the apprehension of the criminal.'0 '
Because the only legitimate reason for showing photographs
to a witness is to aid in the apprehension of suspects, a photo-
graph should not be shown to a witness after the suspect has
been arrested.10 2 Subsequent identification of the accused at a
lineup then shows nothing except that the picture was a good
likeness. The suspect will undoubtedly be singled out by the
witness as the criminal.103 The California Court of Appeals held,
however, that where a witness had been shown three sets of
photographs after the suspect had been arrested, including one
colored photo among black and white photos of others, the sub-
sequent identification of the defendants in two lineups had little
likelihood of mistake.10 4 The Second Circuit also affirmed the
conviction of a suspect identified in a lineup immediately after
being picked out of a group of pictures. It distinguished Sto-
vall by limiting that case to situations in which a long period of
time had elapsed between the crime and the lineup confronta-
tion. 10 5 This strained reading of Stovall ignored the lack of
necessity for showing photographs when the suspect was already
in custody.
A variation of this problem will occur when a suspect's pho-
100. P. WALL, supra note 56, at 68-69.
101. Id. at 66-68.
102. See general discussion of identification by photograph in P.
WALL, supra note 56, at 66.
103. Id.
104. People v. Romero, 272 Cal. App. 2d 39, 77 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
105. United States v. Culotta, 413 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1969).
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tograph has been published in a newspaper and identified with
the crime in question before the lineup. English courts are very
aware of the extent to which such a practice may influence a
witness' identification, and they have taken direct steps to cur-
tail it. If a suspect's photograph has been published in a manner
which may prejudice him, the publisher will be found in con-
tempt of court.10 6
By contrast, American courts have not been concerned with
the effect such a publication may have on the identification of a
suspect. In Roberts v. Gladden,10 7 all of the witnesses to a bank
robbery had seen a suspect's picture and the report of his arrest
for that crime in the newspaper. The court, in affirming the con-
viction, stated that since the police were not instrumental in
causing the publication of the picture and because the lineup
was conducted less than a week after the crime, the suspect
was not prejudiced.10 8 In a later case, the Fifth Circuit held that
even though the police were responsible for the publication of
the picture in the newspaper, the subsequent identification of the
suspect was not tainted by the publication. 0 9
A lineup identification after the witnesses have seen a pic-
ture in a newspaper of the suspect who has been expressly linked
with the commission of the crime has little value. If the person
depicted in the newspaper photograph is obviously not the crimi-
nal, a lineup is not necessary in order for a witness to convey that
fact to the police. If the picture, however, closely resembles the
person the witnesses remember as the criminal, the person in
the photograph is more likely to be singled out by them in the
lineup. The publishing of the suspect's photograph in a news-
paper or the viewing by the witness before a lineup of the sus-
pect's photograph must, at the very least, be considered to be "un-
necessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification."
c. Pre-lineup Confrontation
Similarly, if a suspect has been seen prior to a lineup in cir-
cumstances which made it obvious that he was in custody for
that crime, the lineup has little value. In People v. Jones,"10
106. P. WALL, supra note 56, at 86.
107. 292 F. Supp. 385 (D. Ore. 1968).
108. Id. at 387. See also United States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224
(W.D. Pa. 1969).
109. Agius v. United States, 413 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1969).
110. 18 Mich. App. 368, 171 N.W.2d 223 (1969).
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the victim, in hot pursuit of the criminal, finally caught up to
him after the police had already apprehended him. He saw the
suspect seated in the patrol car and later identified him in a
lineup. The court, in affirming the conviction, stated that the
police officer who arrested the defendant could not have pre-
vented the confrontation.11 1 In a similar situation, the fact that
the victim saw the suspect handcuffed in a police car immediately
after the crime did not taint the subsequent lineup identification
because the victim had seen the suspect several other times dur-
ing the day prior to the crime.11 2
The Supreme Court of Illinois condemned the practice of al-
lowing the witness to see the suspect before the lineup but af-
firmed the conviction in a case in which the victim of a rape was
too hysterical to identify the suspect presented to her by the po-
lice on the night of the crime, but later identified him in a formal
police lineup.1" 3 Although a source other than the lineup iden-
tification may have been established, the circumstances were
suggestive, and it is questionable whether the lineup identifica-
tion was of any value other than to add unfounded reliability to
the victim's testimony at trial.
d. Multiple Confrontations
After a lineup has failed to produce an identification, a
flagrant form of police suggestion has been the viewing by the
same witness of another lineup in which the suspect reappears.
This not only presents the danger of erroneous identification by
merely seeing a familiar face again, but also plainly suggests to
the witness that the police think that this is the criminal. 1 4
An independent source for an in-court identification must also
be suspect since the witness was not confident enough of his
ability to identify the criminal to single him out in the first
lineup. Under these circumstances the United States Supreme
Court in Foster v. California"5 reversed the conviction and re-
manded to the trial court:
In the first lineup arranged by the police, petitioner stood out
from the other two men by the contrast of his height and by
the fact that he was wearing a leather jacket similar to that
worn by the robber. ... When this did not lead to a positive
111. Id. at 372, 171 N.W.2d at 225.
112. State v. Batchelor, 418 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1967).
113. People v. Raymond, 42 I1. 2d 564, 248 N.E.2d 663 (1969).
114. P. WALL, Evr_-WrNizs IDEN=TCATION IN CanvuNA CAsEs 64
(1965).
115. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
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identification, the police permitted a one-to-one confrontation
between petitioner and the witness. . . . Even after this the
witness' identification of petitioner was tentative. So some
days later another lineup was arranged. Petitioner was the
only person in this lineup who had also participated in the first
lineup.... This finally produced a definite identification." o
In condemning this procedure, the Court stated:
The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made
it all but inevitable that [the witness] would identify petitioner
whether or not he was in fact "the man." In effect, the police
repeatedly said to the witness, "This is the man." . . . This pro-
cedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identifi-
cation as to violate due process. 117
Another court, however, has held that multiple confronta-
tions did not violate the fourteenth amendment. In State v.
Cummings,118 the victim, after tentatively identifying an indi-
vidual from mug shots, viewed a lineup which included the de-
fendant but could not identify anyone. In a subsequent lineup,
with the defendant again participating, the victim picked out the
defendant. The court held that the defendant's right to due
process of law had not been violated. This case, decided after
Foster, cannot readily be distinguished from Foster, and it is dif-
ficult to understand how the court ignored the holding in that
case in affirming the conviction.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, reversed a con-
viction because a lineup was conducted in an unnecessarily sug-
gestive manner. There the witness had viewed a lineup without
being able to identify anyone. He then accompanied police to
look at the car he had previously described to them and, after the
police indicated that two of the lineup participants had been ap-
prehended in the car, and at the police's request, viewed the
lineup again and identified two of the participants."0 The court,
in reversing, quoted the witness as testifying, "[I] t was sup-
posed to be two boys, so I guessed and I said those two boys. The
more I did look the more they actually did look like the guys that
did rob me.' 1 20
An even more blatant violation of due process results when
a suspect is viewed in a showup after the witness failed to iden-
tify him in a lineup. Yet, at least one court has held that there
was not a violation of due process when the witness identified the
116. Id. at 442-43.
117. Id. at 443.
118. 445 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. 1969).
119. Commonwealth v. Lee, 215 Pa. Super. 240, 257 A.2d 326 (1969).
120. Id. at 243, 257 A.2d at 328.
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suspect in this second confrontation. 12 1
'The Supreme Court of North Carolina was confronted with
a ease in Which the witness, after viewing a lineup without being
able to identify anyone, observed one participant alone at the
authorities' request while the suspect was wearing clothing simi-
lar to that which she had described. The court held that her
identification after this second confrontation was induced by a
violation of due process. 22
Any pre-lineup influence by suggestive police statement, un-
necessary. photographic display, pre-lineup confrontation or mul-
tiple. confrontations can be "unnecessarily suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable mistaken identification." Most courts, how-
ever, have used the "totality of the circumstances" reasoning to
avoid finding a violation of due process. Under this approach
pre-lineup procedures can continue to be suggestive as long as the
suggestive factors are outweighed by the proper procedures used
in the same lineup by law enforcement officials. If courts con-
tinue to find a violation of due process only in the face of flagrant
police conduct, the spirit in which Stovall was decided will, in
all but a few isolated cases, be effectively throttled.
2. Lineup Suggestion
• If the lineup has not been tainted by suggestive procedures
prior to the actual confrontation, the police have a continuing re-
sponsibility to assure fairness during the actual viewing. Due
process of law may be impaired at this stage both by the compo-
sition of the lineup and by the actions of the lineup participants:
The composition of the line-up-how many persons are in it,
what they look like, what they wear, who they are-is a matter
of great importance, for unless it is completely free from sug-
gestive influences, its value.will be greatly diminished, if not
destroyed. Indeed, so important is this point considered in
England, that informal police rules require that the suspect be
asked if he is satisfied with the lineup, and suggestions have
been made that the officer in charge have one or two persons
in reserve for the substitutions which are sometimes made at
the suspect's request.123
The physical characteristics of the other participants should
closely resemble those of the suspect.12 4 If the lineup is com-
posed so as to focus undue attention on one participant, any iden-
121. People v. Brunson, 1 Cal App. 3d 226, 81 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1969).
122. State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968).
123. P. WALL, supra note 114, at 52.
124. Id.'at 53;-Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad,
1966 UTAH L. R v. 610, 628.
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tification made would be of little probative value.
Lower courts have chosen, however, to apply loose limits to
the "unnecessarily suggestive" standard set forth in Stovall when
considering the clothes and physical characteristics of the lineup
participants.
a. Race
Obviously, persons exclusively of the same race,'1 26 ethnic
background or sex126 should be used as participants when the
description so dictates. In State v. Parker,27 however, the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota held that there was no violation
of due process when the witness, who had been assaulted by three
Indians, picked three Indians out of a lineup of six people, when
the lineup contained only three Indians. The court relied on the
fact that since the witness had been with the defendants for a
considerable length of time, and since the lineup was staged
shortly after the crime, the identification was not based on the
lineup.128
The California Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a
robbery suspect in a similar situation, but this lineup, unlike
Parker, took place six and one-half months after the crimes.1 29
The defendant was the only Negro in a four-man lineup. The
court stated, "[Witness] had seen a Negro commit the burglary.
Defendant was a Negro: the three men lined up with him for
confrontation by [the witness] were not, and this fact was im-
mediately evident to [the witness]. ' ' 30  In a subsequent case,
the California Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of the
defendant after he had been identified in a lineup in which he
was the only Mexican, finding that the lineup was unnecessarily
suggestive and therefore constitutionally unfair.' 3' This lineup
occurred shortly after the crime, as in Parker.
125. People v. Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509, 524
(1968).
126. But see State v. Batchelor, 418 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1967), in
which defendant was the only female in the lineup. The court in af-
firming the conviction stated, "There was nothing done here by the
officer conducting the lineup which would tend to suggest to the iden-
tifying witness that appellant was the guilty culprit in the minds of the
police."
127. 282 Minn. 343, 164 N.W.2d 633 (1969).
128. Id. at 359, 164 N.W.2d at 643.
129. People v. Hogan, 264 Cal. App. 2d 254, 70 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968).
130. Id. at 260, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
131. People v. Espinoza Menchaca, 264 Cal. App. 2d 642, 70 Cal. Rptr.
843 (1968).
[Vol. 55:779
PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION
The courts are sometimes faced with circumstances in which
it is impossible to present a lineup with sufficient members
of the same ethnic background because none were available at
the time. The California Court of Appeals held that a lineup con-
ducted with two Caucasian suspects and three Mexicans did
not warrant reversal. The court noted that the jail at the time of
the lineup contained the two Caucasian suspects, ten Mexicans
and a hippy and that the delay necessary to procure participants
for a proper lineup would necessarily sacrifice freshness of the
witness' memory.1
32
Two California courts have taken a functional approach
to this requirement and have held that even though the lineup
participants were of different ethnic backgrounds, as long as
they resembled each other closely, it was permissible.' 33 This
approach would be in accord with the Stovall standard of sugges-
tive influences since a witness would not focus on any one indi-
vidual.
If the police, through necessity, are forced to display partici-
pants of obviously diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds, it
would seem that the lineup has served no legitimate purpose and
should be eliminated. The confrontation is obviously unduly
suggestive under any lineup circumstances-in their totality or
in any conceivable discerptible portion thereof-and Stovall has
been compromised.
b. Physical Characteristics
A similar problem of suggestion during a lineup is presented
when the suspect has an unusual physical characteristic or de-
fect which was included in the witness' description of the crimi-
nal. In order to avoid this as a source of suggestion the sus-
pect's noticeable abnormality or defect should be concealed or, if
that is not possible, all members of the lineup should be made to
appear as if they have the same characteristic. 3 4  This precau-
tion is often taken in England.13 r The authorities in the United
States, however, have not been overly concerned with lineup
identifications made from participants with different colored hair,
beards, mustaches and distinctive marks.
132. People v. Smith, 273 Cal. App. 2d 547, 78 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1969).
133. People v. Noisey, 265 Cal. App. 2d 543, 71 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1968);
People v. Lasiter, 265 Cal. App. 2d 361, 71 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1968).
134. P. WALL, supra note 114, at 54.
135. Id.
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1. Physical Features
Because hair color will usually be a part of a witness' de-
scription, fairness dictates that the color and length of hair
should be closely approximated among all participants of the
lineup. 13 6  Courts have, however, upheld convictions based on
identifications of a light-haired suspect in a lineup with two other
dark-haired persons 13 7 and of a Negro suspect with "processed"
hair when only one other participant had such a hair treat-
ment,13 8 on the ground that the lineups were not unnecessarily
suggestive.
Similar problems occur when a description of a criminal in-
cludes a mustache or beard. To avoid unnecessary suggestion, the
police should present all participants clean-shaven or all with
beards or mustaches. 39 In People v. Graves,140 the criminal
was described as clean-shaven. The court, however, held that
even though the suspect was the only clean-shaven participant,
due process had not been violated.14 ' Similarly, in State v. Des-
sureault,42 the police presented the suspect with a beard and
mustache together with three other clean-shaven participants.
The court held that this was an unduly suggestive lineup, but af-
firmed the conviction on the ground that the witness positively
and unequivocally made the identification. 43 To avoid focusing
attention on a suspect, distinguishing marks or defects of that
person should be covered or reproduced on the other members
of the lineup.14
4
The court, in People v. Beivelman,145 properly recognized
the authorities' efforts at fairness in minimizing the effect of a
distinguishing defect and affirmed the conviction. There, the
suspect had broken a leg during the commission of the crime.
136. Id. at 53.
137. Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616 (1969). See
also United States v. Holsey, 414 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1969) where the
blond suspect was given the choice of wearing a dark-colored wig to
resemble the other members of the lineup but refused and was subse-
quently identified.
138. People v. Boyce, 113 Ill. App. 2d 266, 252 N.E.2d 71 (1969).
139. This requirement follows from the prohibition of any physi-
cal characteristic which noticeably sets the suspect apart from the other
participants. See Comment, 29 PITT. L. REV. 65 (1967) and P. WALL, supra
note 114.
140. 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1968).
141. Id. at 741-42, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
142. 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969).
143. Id. at 385, 453 P.2d at 956.
144. P. WALL, supra note 114, at 54.
145. 70 Cal. 2d 60, 447 P.2d 913, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1968).
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The other participants in the lineup wore a shoe on one foot, a
white sock on the other and used crutches, as did the suspect.1"'
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, held that where
the defendant was identified in a lineup in which he was the only
participant with freckles, there was no violation of due process.
Although the witness had described the criminal as freckled, the
court stressed the fact that there were nine men in the lineup
and all were about the same age and height.147  A conviction
was upheld in a similar case before the Illinois Supreme Court.4 8
In that case the victim's description, although vague on other
characteristics of the criminal, was definite on the fact that the
criminal had a pock-marked face. Defendant was the only partic-
ipant in the lineup with a pock-marked face. The court held that
this confrontation did not violate due process of law. The court
emphasized that the victim immediately selected defendant, all
participants were Negro and all were approximately the same
age and height.1 49 In short, these two courts balanced the ac-
ceptable attributes of the lineup against the -unacceptable and,
since there were more good features than bad, found that the
suspect's right to due process had not been violated. This ap-
proach, however, does little to insure lineups from unnecessary
suggestion.
2. Size
Since height and weight are perhaps the most common fea-
tures used in describing an individual, lineup participants should
be similar in size.150 Because these are such common identifying
characteristics and lineup identifications are so often based on
compliance with the initial description given by the witness, one
authority has gone so far as to suggest that height delineations
on the wall behind the lineup members be removed to preclude a
witness from relying on them to identify a suspect similar to his
initial description.15'
American courts have generally not felt compelled to re-
verse a conviction based on the difference in size of the members
of the lineup. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction which
had been appealed on the ground that the defendant was the only
146. Id. at 78, 447 P.2d at 923, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
147. State v. McConoughie, 282 Minm. 161, 163 N.W.2d 568 (1968).
.-148. People v. Chambers, 112 fI1- App. 2d 347, 251 NXE.2d 362 (1969).
149. Id. at 352, 251 N.E.2d at 364-65.
150. See Comment, supra note 139, at Appendix 1(3).
151. P. WAiL, supra note 114, at 63.
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one in the lineup fitting the description of a light-skinned Negro,
6 ft. 2 in. to 6 ft. 4 in. tall and 190 pounds.'52 The other lineup
members were all darker complected and shorter. In a concur-
ring opinion which focused on harmless error, it was stated that
"the lineup procedures employed in this case were not per-
fect, but they were fairly good and were not so devoid of merit as
to make them wholly suspect."'15 3
The Court in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy indicated a
desire to remove unnecessary suggestion which could lead to er-
roneous identification from pretrial confrontation. A pretrial
identification procedure which is "fairly good" does little to move
identification procedures toward that end.
Several courts, in affirming convictions, have relied on the
circular reasoning that since the jury had a chance to weigh the
evidence of the lineup and had voted to convict the defendant,
the lineup was not suggestive.15 4  Other courts have held that
a discrepancy in size between members of a lineup is not, by it-
self, sufficient grounds for reversal of a conviction.155
A suspect of unusual stature, of course, will present a prob-
lem to the police in presenting a lineup free from suggestive in-
fluence. The California Court of Appeals held that where the
suspect was five feet tall and the other participants were as short
as possible, there was no violation of due process.'5 In such a
situation, the police should be able to equalize the participants'
height by requiring some to stand on platforms of varying heights
and concealing the participants from the shoulders to the floor.
It would, of course, be desirable to view a suspect fully, but this
procedure would, at least, disguise an obvious distinguishing
characteristic of the suspect.
Several courts have found the differences in the participants'
height, weight and coloring to be so great as to violate the de-
fendant's right to due process of law. An example is the decision
152. Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968).
153. Id. at 253-54 (emphasis added).
154. State v. Lyons, 251 S.C. 541, 164 S.E.2d 445 (1968); People v.
Terczak, 96 Ill. App. 2d 373, 238 N.E.2d 626 (1968).
155. United States v. Johnson, 403 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir. 1968); People
v. Farley, 267 Cal. App. 2d 214, 72 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1968); People v. Bon-
ville, 268 Cal. App. 2d 107, 71 Cal. Rptr. 851, modified and aff'd, 268
Cal. App. 2d 107, 73 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1968); State v. Balle, 442 S.W.2d
35 (Mo. 1969).
156. People v. Elder, 274 Cal. App. 2d 381, 79 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1969).
Other mitigating circumstances in this case were the fact that the wit-
ness had identified the defendant immediately and had ample opportunity
to observe the defendant during the commission of the crime.
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of the California Court of Appeals in People v. Caruso.15 7 There
the defendant was "of imposing stature, being 6 feet 1 inch tall,
and weighing 238 pounds. He is of Italian descent, with a very
dark, complexion, and has dark wavy hair."'158  The witnesses
testified that "the other lineup participants did not physically re-
semble defendant. They were not his size, not one had his dark
complexion, and none had dark wavy hair."159 The court, in re-
versing the' conviction' for robbery, stated, "[I]f they were to
choose anyone in the lineup, defendant was singularly marked for
identification. We can only conclude that the lineup was 'unnec-
essarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identi-
fication.' "160
The -Supreme Court of Minnesota, although affirming the
conviction of a suspect selected from a three-man lineup in which
the participants were of widely varying height, weight and color-
ing, indicated that the police were to be more conscientious in
presenting a formal lineup in the future.'8 ' The court empha-
sized:
[W]e think that the police should make every effort in their
conduct of lineups to insure against the dangers of the number
of persons appearing in lineups and using persons with some
degree of similarity, at least in height and weight, to the one
thought to have committed the crime. This is not to say that
everyone in the lineup must be exactly the same in height and
build, but the greater the number of persons in the lineup who
approximate the description of the one who committed the
crime, the greater the chance the identification is correct and
the stronger it will be in the eyes of a jury.8 2
In a subsequent case, 16 3 the Supreme Court of Minnesota re-
versed and remanded a conviction for robbery in a case in which
evidence of a lineup identification. had been used. The lineup
consisted of three-people, one of whom was "substantially larger"
than defendant. The court focused on this size variance along
with the fact that the witness had identified defendant from
mug shots fifteen minutes before the lineup, and that the witness
had observed the criminal for only 30 seconds during the commis-
sion of the robbery.8 4
157. 68 Cal. 2d 183, 436 P.2d 336, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1968).
158. Id. at 187, 436 P.2d at 339, 65 CaL Rptr. at 339.
159. Id.
160. Id a t 187-88, 436 P.2d at 339, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
161. State v. Burch, 284 lnmn. 300, 170 N.W.2d 543 (1969).
" 162:'Id: at-315, 170 N.W.2dat 553.
163. State v. Gluff, 285 Minn. 148, 172 N.W.2d 63 (1969).
164. Id. at- 150-51, 172 N.W.2d at 65. See also text accompanying
notes 100-109 supra.
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3. Age
Age also is usually part of the description given by a wit-
ness. Thus, the participants in the lineup should be approxi-
mately the same age or appear to be so.1" The court, however, in
People v. Terry,166 held that an obvious difference in age was not
enough by itself to show that a denial of due process had oc-
curred. In that case, the description given by the witness indi-
cated that the criminal was in his thirties. The defendant, who
coincided with that description, was placed in a lineup with per-
sons in their early twenties or in their teens. 11 However, the
court in United States v. Washington08 reversed a conviction
where the pre-trial identification had been tainted by placing the
defendant in a cell along with older men for the confrontation,
although other factors present also reduced the reliability of the
identification.' 69
c. Clothing
When a suspect is presented in a lineup wearing a style of
clothing different from that of the other participants, particu-
larly when the clothes are not those worn during the crime, the
courts generally have ignored the suggestive implications in-
volved in the procedure. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the con-
viction of a defendant who was picked out of a lineup composed
of five policemen wearing white shirts and dress trousers and
the defendant who wore a light blue shirt and "shiny or silky
black pants." 70 The court stated, "[W] e see no telling variation
from [defendant's] appearance in the dress. . or other features
of those in the lineup, as would mark him as a nonconformist.""1 '
Although the practice of requiring only the suspect to wear
the clothes worn during the crime is suggestive, some courts have
held this not to be a violation of due process. The Sixth Circuit
165. Comment, supra note 139, at Appendix 1(3).
166. 70 Cal. 2d 410, 545 P.2d 36, 77 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1969).
167. This court seemed to be balancing the acceptable and unaccept-
able attributes of the lineup and since the acceptable outweighed the
unacceptable, there was no violation of due process. This is contra to
the spirit of Stovall. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
168. 292 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1968).
169. Id. at 289. Other factors were the suggestive photographic dis-
play procedure used by the police prior to the actual confrontation and
the fact that a considerable length of time had elapsed between the
crime and the identification confrontation.
170. United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969).
171. Id. at 698.
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held that a lineup in which only the suspect was forced to wear a
black, hooded jacket which was part of the description of the rob-
ber was not unnecessarily suggestive.172 In affirming the con-
viction, the court stated, "[a] ll that happened here was that [de-
fendant] was placed in a lineup and required to wear his own
jacket."'173 The same rationale was used by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in holding that the defendant's right to due
process of law had been preserved in a lineup conducted with
only the defendant wearing a belt looped around his neck in
the manner described by the victim. 174 The court justified its
affirmance by concluding:
[The belt] was placed there by defendant himself-not by law
enforcement authorities. The officers were under no compul-
sion, constitutional or'otherwise, to remove it. Nor were they re-
quired to place similar belts around the necks of the other
boys in the lineup. Its presence cannot be attributed to the of-
ficer or regarded as the kind of rigged "suggestiveness" in iden-
tification procedures which Wade and Gilbert and Foster were
designed to deter. Its presence was simply an existing fact-
it was around defendant's neck when he was picked up, there
when he was taken to the police station, and still there when
viewed by the victim. No one put the belt on him and no one
asked him to remove it. The victim was permitted to see him
in raiment of his own choosing.175
The court in People v. Chambers'7  held that the fact that
the defendant was the only participant to wear a green jacket
such as the one described by the victim was not a violation of due
process. Although the police did not force the suspect to wear
the incriminating garb, it must be conceded that such an appear-
ance was "unnecessarily suggestive." Despite the witness' state-
ment that she recognized the defendant by his green jacket, this
fact was considered only in the weight of the evidence to be given
the identification.177 The California Court of Appeals also has
held that a lineup in which defendant was forced to wear a green
shirt that was a part of the criminal's description was fair because
the defendant would have focused more attention on himself if
he had appeared bare-chested as he had requested.178 Several
less suggestive alternatives could have been used by the police:
172. United States v. Ball, 381 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1967).
173. Id. at 703.
174. State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969).
175. Id. at 429, 168 S.E.2d at 356. Accord, Hernandez v. State, 7
Md. App. 355, 255 A.2d 449 (1969).
176. 112 ]li. App. 2d 347, 251 N.E.2d 362 (1969).
177. Id. at 354-55, 251 N.E.2d at 366.
178. People v. Stanton, 274 Cal. App. 2d 13, 78 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1969).
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a different shirt could have been produced by the police for the
defendant to wear, all participants could have been dressed in
prison clothes or all could have been required in turn to wear
the green shirt. The Sixth Circuit recognized the fairness of
providing similar clothes for all participants in a lineup where all
participants were required to wear a blue coat, sunglasses and a
handkerchief mask. The suspect was identified and the court af-
firmed the conviction.1 9
It would seem that the police should not be excused from the
requirement of presenting all participants similarly clothed, even
if similar civilian clothes are not available for the participants.
The police could provide all participants with prison garb to
maintain fairness.18 0
d. Suggestive Police Action
The police, in addition to refraining from focusing attention
on an individual participant by his physical characteristics and
clothing, should avoid drawing attention to him by requiring him
to do something not done by the other lineup participants.
The courts have generally held that an express instruction
by the officer conducting the lineup to a participant which would
draw unnecessary attention to him is too suggestive and violates
the defendant's right to due process. The District Court of the
District of Columbia held in two cases that such a procedure was
unfair when special attention was focused on the suspects. In
one case,' 8 ' a witness was taken to a jail cell in which the defend-
ant and four or five older men were confined. The officer, be-
fore the witness had made an identification, told the defendant to
move over with the rest of the men. The witness then identi-
fied him. The court in reversing the conviction said that the na-
ture of this procedure was "shoddy."' 8 2 The second case' 8 3 in-
volved a confrontation in which the witness viewed the suspect,
a Caucasian, along with two other Caucasians and ten Negroes in
a cell. The defendant was told by the officer to step closer to the
witness so that he could see him better. The witness then identi-
fied him. Although the conviction was affirmed because of an
identification by another witness, the jail cell identification was
179. United States v. Beard, 381 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1967).
180. This was done in Barker v. State, 84 Nev. 224, 438 P.2d 798
(1968) and Calbert v. State, 84 Nev. 148, 437 P.2d 628 (1968).
181. United States v. Washington, 292 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1968).
182. Id. at 288.
183. United States v. Clark, 294 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1968).
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held to be too suggestive and, therefore, inadmissible in evi-
dence.1 8 4
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and re-
manded a case in which the police flagrantly violated this re-
quirement of fairness. 8 5 The victim of the crime saw her assail-
ant walk away from her, but never saw his face. The description
she gave the police was of a man wearing dark pants, a light
shirt and a baseball cap. The defendant was arrested for an-
other crime and participated in a lineup with nine other men,
no one of whom could be identified by the victim. The of-
ficer then forced only the defendant to wear dark pants, a
light shirt and a baseball cap and to utter words spoken during
the crime as he walked back and forth in front of her. The
victim then identified him. 86
The court in People v. Nelson,387 however, held that where
the defendant attempted to conceal his face with his arms dur-
ing the confrontation and was subsequently identified, the con-
viction should be affirmed. - In justifying its position the court
stated that an independent source for in-court identification had
been established and that, if the defendant stood out at the
lineup, it was his own fault, not that of the police.'8 8
Several cases have held that where the suspect has been fo-
cused upon at the initiation of the witness, due process has not
been violated. The witness in People v. Eaton,8 9 after view-
ing a lineup and tentatively identifying the two suspects in
prison clothes, asked to view the two suspects again in civilian
clothes. At the second confrontation, the witness again identi-
fied them. The court affirmed the conviction, relying on the fact
that the witness had already identified the suspects in a fair
lineup before the second confrontation. 9 0 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the conviction of a robber who was compelled to
put on a hat and to utter certain words at the witness' insist-
ence.' 9 ' He was then positively identified after being required
184. Id. at 52.
185. State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968).
186. Id. at 584
187. 40 Ill. 2d 146, 238 N.E.2d 378 (1968).
188. Id. at 152, 238 N..2d at 382. An independent source was
based on the facts that the witness had known defendant for about five
months, that defendant "came in the store 'quite frequently' and that
he had contacts with the defendant 'outside the store ... on various oc-
casions."' Id. at 151, 238 N.E.2d at 381.
189. 275 Cal. App. 2d 584, 80 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1969).
190. Id. at 588-89, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
191. Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967).
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to wear a coat that had been described by the witness. The court
affirmed on the grounds that the witness had initiated the sin-
gling out of the defendant and that the witness "had already set-
tled firmly on defendant.1 92  The court, however, stated in
dicta, "[E]ven when the witness requests that the person he
has tentatively identified be required to do or say something,
all participants in the lineup should be required to act or speak
... . We think it is unquestionably fairer than singling out the
tentative suspect.1
93
3. Summary
The courts, although acknowledging the application of Sto-
vail to due process questions involving fundamental fairness,
have generally not applied the test in the spirit of the Stovall
decision. The majority of the courts have eagerly seized on the
ambiguity inherent in the phrase "totality of the circumstances"
used by the Stovall Court to find grossly unfair lineups not in
violation of due process. Most courts have interpreted "totality"
to refer only to the lineup confrontation itself. This interpreta-
tion has allowed the court to balance the "fair" characteristics of
the lineup with the "unfair" and find the lineup not violative of
due process if the "fair" outweighs the "unfair." If a suspect
was significantly shorter, for example, than the other lineup
participants, but other characteristics of the participants were
similar, this interpretation of "totality of the circumstances"
would permit a finding that the confrontation satisfied due pro-
cess requirements. This interpretation, however, has done little
to protect the suspect from possible "irreparable mistaken iden-
tification" because of this "unnecessarily suggestive" character-
istic in the pretrial identification procedure. In addition, because
due process has required only this simple weighing process, law
enforcement officials have had little incentive to remove an "un-
necessarily suggestive" characteristic from the lineup. The
"dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggesti-
bility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification," rec-
ognized by the Court, have remained despite the spirit of the de-
cision in Stovall.
IV. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
If, in the opinion of the court, a pretrial confrontation has
violated due process, the in-court identification of the suspect by
192. Id. at 40.
193. Id.
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the witness may still be allowed if the witness had an inde-
pendent source for the in-court identification, or an appellate
court holds that the admission of the in-court identification
was harmless error.1
9 4
A. INDEPENDENT SOURCE
Lower courts since Stovall have considered various factors
in the establishment of an independent source:1 95 opportunity
for observation of the criminal,' 90 illumination of the scene of the
crime,' gz accuracy of the description of the criminal,198 the
lapse of time between the crime and the pretrial identification,199
failure of the witness to identify other suspects, 20 0 prompt identi-
fication,20 ' positive identification 20 2 and the intelligence of the
witness.203
Most factors suggested by the Court204 and many factors con-
sidered by the lower courts have been weighed as positive or neg-
ative variables and have thereby influenced the decisions of the
lower courts.2 0 5 For example, if the opportunity for observation
of the criminal by the witness during the crime was extensive,
that factor would be used as a positive variable by the court to
establish an independent basis for the in-court identification. If
the opportunity for observation was brief, that factor would be
194. See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
195. See note 18 supra for the factors given by the Wade court to be
considered by the lower courts in an examination of an independent
basis for in-court identification.
196. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 104 Ariz. 510, 456 P.2d 368 (1969) (one
hour to observe); People v. Singletary, 268 Cal. App. 2d 41, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 855 (1968) (thirty to forty-five minutes to observe); People v.
James, 109 f11 App. 2d 328, 248 N.E.2d 777 (1969) (twenty minutes to
observe).
197. See, e.g., People v. Airheart, 262 Cal. App. 2d 673, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 857 (1968); People v. Terczak, 96 Ill. App. 2d 373, 238 N.E.2d 626
(1968); Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 23, 249 A.2d 732 (1969).
198. See, e.g., Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616
(1969).
199. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 6 Md. App. 555, 252 A2d 259 (1969).
200. See, e.g., Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616 (1969).
201. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 354 Mass. 598, 239 N.E.
2d 5 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1056 (1969); State v. Balle, 442 S.W.2d
35 (Mo. 1969); Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616 (1969).
202. See, e..g., United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1969);
People v. Smith, 273 Cal. App. 2d 547, 78 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1020 (1970); State v. Balle, 442 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969).
203. United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1969).
204. See note 18 supra.
205. Some factors suggested by the Court were constants rather
than variables, i.e., any identification prior to the lineup of another
person.
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considered by the court as a negative variable to question the re-
liability of the in-court identification.
The opportunity for observation of the criminal by the wit-
ness during the crime has been the most frequent factor to be
weighed by the lower courts. When the length of time has been
considerable, the reliability of the identification has been almost
unquestioned,20 6 but as the length of time has decreased, the re-
liability of the in-court identification has become suspect. In
People v. Ballott20 7 the brief opportunity for observation by the
victim could not support an in-court identification on the record.
The court said that the victim had seen the robber "but for a few
minutes during a frightening and upsetting episode. '20  The
court continued:
We cannot say ... that on the record before us the in-court
identification was not predicated at least in part, upon the
earlier grossly and unnecessarily suggestive show-up in the
police station a year after the crime had been committed. 20 9
Other courts have held, however, that brief periods of time
could provide ample opportunity for studied observation by the
witness. In Hill v. State210 two witnesses had fifteen seconds at
a distance of 30 yards and three seconds at a distance of one foot
to observe two robbers. More than four months after the crime,
both witnesses in the presence of each other identified two men
as the criminals. One defendant was acquitted at trial because
he was in a hospital at the time of the crime. The second de-
fendant was convicted. In affirming the conviction the court
stated that eighteen seconds was a sufficient time for observation
by the witnesses to establish an independent basis for an in-court
identification. 211 The court in Ballot quite properly used the
factor of brief opportunity for observation as a negative variable
in questioning the reliability of the in-court identification. In
contrast thereto a much shorter opportunity for observation was
considered by the court in Hill as a positive variable in establish-
ing the reliability of the in-court identification.
The length of time between the crime and the pretrial iden-
206. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 104 Ariz. 510, 456 P.2d 368 (1969);
People v. Singletary, 268 Cal. App. 2d 41, 73 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1968);
People v. James, 109 Ill. App. 2d 328, 248 N.E.2d 777 (1969).
207. 20 N.Y.2d 600, 233 N.E.2d 103, 286 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
208. Id. at 607, 233 N.E.2d at 107, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
209. Id.
210. 6 Md. App. 555, 252 A.2d 259 (1969).
211. Id. at 558, 252 A.2d at 261,
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tification has also been considered by the lower courts. When the
length of time has been short, this lapse has been used as support
for an independent basis for the in-court identification. Some
courts, however, have used a somewhat flexible definition of the
term "short." In Lucas v. State,21 2 for example, two months were
considered to be a "short" lapse of time between the crime and
the pretrial identification.213 This would seem to be further evi-
dence of an effort by some courts to twist a factor to establish an
independent basis for an in-court identification.
The speed with which the pretrial identification was made
also has been considered as a factor. It has been used, however,
by the courts for the establishment of an independent basis for
the in-court identification irrespective of the speed with which
the pretrial identification was made. If the pretrial identification
was without hesitation, this has indicated instant recognition by
the witness.21 4 If the identification took a long period of time,
this has indicated the fairness of the witness in an effort to be
certain.21 5 If speed of identification is only used as a positive
variable to uphold an in-court identification, it should be re-
moved from court consideration as a self-serving factor.
B. HARMims ERRoR
Few courts have used the doctrine of harmless error to allow
an in-court identification of the suspect by an identifying wit-
ness.216 When the doctrine has been used, it has been applied in
two ways. Most courts which have considered the doctrine have
held that the defendant was not prejudiced by an in-court iden-
tification since the witness could have identified the suspect ir-
respective of any tainted pretrial identification procedure.2 17
212. 44 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
213. Id. But see Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1967) (dissent);
People v. Ballott, 20 N.Y.2d 600, 233 NXE.2d 103, 286 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
In both opinions emphasis was placed upon the extreme lapse of time be-
tween the crime and the pretrial identification.
214. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 354 Mass. 598, 239 N.E.2d 5
(1968), cert. denied, 393 US. 1056 (1969); State v. Balle, 442 S.W.2d
(Mo. 1969); Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616 (1969).
215. People v. Pelow, 24 N.Y.2d 161, 247 N.E.2d 150, 299 N.Y.S.2d
185 (1969).
216. The leading case for the doctrine of harmless error is Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Court in Chapman held that a
court must be able to declare its belief that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt before constitutional error can be held to
be harmless. Id. at 21-24. If the untainted evidence against the de-
fendant is overwhelming, the error in admission of the tainted evidence
will also be harmless. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
217. Soloman v. United States, 408 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People
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Other courts have indicated that the admission of the in-court
identification of the defendant was harmless error because the
other evidence introduced by the prosecution was overwhelm-
ingly against the defendant.218 Only in a few isolated in-
stances have courts held that the prosecution's burden of proving
the error harmless has not been met. Where the prosecution has
failed to meet this burden, the convictions have been over-
turned.
2 19
Most courts in applying the standard have accorded the con-
cept cursory treatment or no treatment at all. Instead the courts
have used independent source as justification for an in-court
identification of the suspect by the witness after a tainted pre-
trial identification procedure.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy rec-
ognized the "dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and
the suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identi-
fication, '220 and the Court acted to protect the accused during the
pretrial identification procedure. Lower courts, however, in the
application of Stovall, except in outrageous situations, have
failed to find a violation of due process. Every method of avoid-
ance has been used by the lower courts. In a substantial ma-
jority of cases, the courts have found that the confrontation was
not "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification, ' 22' as to be a violation of due process. If
the confrontation was tainted, the courts have easily found an
"independent source" for an in-court identification of the suspect,
v. Brown, 273 Cal. App. 2d 109, 77 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1969); People v. Laur-
sen, 266 Cal. App. 2d 116, 71 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1969). A typical statement
by a court is:
In some cases the proceeding leading to an eyewitness identifi-
cation may be so defective as to make the identification consti-
tutionally inadmissable as a matter of law. But [the courts]
then look to Chapman v. California ... and find that the
invalid lineup was harmless and for the reason that defendant
was in fact identified from source independent of the lineup.
Hampton v. State, 462 P.2d 760 (Nev. 1969). The use of harmless error
in this fashion closely resembles the court use of independent source.
218. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Soloman v.
United States, 408 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Russell v. United States,
408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
219. Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People
v. Hogan, 264 Cal. App. 2d 254, 70 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968); Watson v. State,
7 Md. App. 225, 255 A.2d 103 (1969).
220. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
221. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
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or in the court's opinion any error in the admission of the in-
court identification was harmless. Consequently, law enforce-
ment officials have not been motivated to provide pretrial iden-
tification procedures free from unnecessary suggestion. They
have been moved only to provide "fairly good" procedures which
meet the due process requirements.
Thus, the courts have placed their imprimatur upon highly
questionable pretrial identifications. The continued case-by-case
determination by the courts will do little to remove unnecessary
suggestibility in pretrial identification. If pretrial identification
procedures free from unnecessary suggestion are eventually to
be achieved, other methods will have to be developed.
Recently there has been some discussion concerning expan-
sion of the rule-making process to include areas not presently
covered by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. An expan-
sion of the rules could properly include pretrial identification
procedures. Alternatively, a statute governing those procedures
could be adopted. This would serve to clarify the exact proce-
dures to be followed by law enforcement officials while assuring
suspects an atmosphere free from unnecessary suggestion dur-
ing pretrial identification. The rule of procedure or statute
might take the following form:
A- GE ERAL RUL=
Pretrial identification by a witness of a suspect who has been
taken into custody will be through a formally conducted
lineup. Absent an intelligent waiver, the suspect will be rep-
resented by counsel who will be permitted to be in the pres-
ence of the witness during the pretrial identification. The
lineup will consist of at least six participants similarly
clothed who approximate each other in age, height, weight,
hair and skin coloration. Law enforcement officials shall
make a written report of the names, addresses and descriptive
details of the participants in the lineup, and lineups will be
photographed. If voice identification is requested by a wit-
ness, the participants in the lineup shall repeat an identical
innocuous phrase, but use of words allegedly used during the
crime will be impermissible.
Before the lineup witnesses will be required to give a
description of the suspect, and law enforcement officials shall
make a written record of the description which must be
signed by the witness. If more than one witness is to make a
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pretrial identification, witnesses will view the lineup sep-
arately and will not be allowed to communicate with other
witnesses until all witnesses have completed the identifica-
tion process.
Law enforcement officials shall not suggest to a witness
before or during the lineup that a participant in the lineup
has been arrested as a suspect. Photographs of a suspect who
has been taken into custody or of other participants in the
lineup will not be shown to a witness prior to the lineup.
The suspect who has been taken into custody or other partici-
pants in the lineup will not be viewed by a witness prior to
the lineup.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
(1) A lineup consisting of photographs of individuals will be
permissible if it is in conformance with the requirements of
(A) and if
(i) five individuals who resemble the suspect are not
available, or
(ii) a witness is in danger of death.
(2) If a suspect has been taken into custody by law enforce-
ment officials within one hour of the crime, a field identifi-
cation will be permissible.
C. EVIDENTIARY EXCLUSIONS
Failure to conform with any pretrial identification procedure
in (A) or (B) will prevent the admission of an in-court iden-
tification of the suspect by the witness and testimony at trial
by the witness concerning a pretrial identification. How-
ever, if an accidental pretrial confrontation and identifica-
tion or a field identification of the suspect by a witness has
occurred the prosecution shall give notice to the defendant or
his counsel of their intention at trial to rely upon the acci-
dental confrontation and identification or upon the field
identification. A pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the
in-court identification of the suspect by the witness will then
be conducted. 222 Failure by the prosecution to give notice to
defendant or his counsel will prevent the admission of an in-
court identification.
222. At the pretrial hearing the factors suggested by Wade to es-
tablish an "independent source" would be used to rule on the admis-
sibility of an in-court identification. A pretrial hearing rule has been
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Defense counsel for the suspect will be allowed to make
copies of photographs or written reports required by (A) or
(B). 2 23
adopted in the District of Columbia. See Clemons v. United States, 408
F.2d 1230, 1237 and n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1968). This practice has also been
recommended by Judge Friendly. See United States ex reL Phipps v.
Follette, 428 F.2d 912, 913 and n.1 (2d Cir. 1970).
223. The Court has quoted with approval one commentator's ideal
statute. United States v. Wade, 288 U.S. 218, 236 n.26 (1967). The
American Law Institute has also written a proposed statute for pre-
arraignment procedure which provides:
(1) Restrictions on Identification. No law enforcement officer
shall conduct a line-up or otherwise attempt, by having a
witness view or hear the voice of an arrested person, to
secure the identification of an arrested person as a person
involved in crime unless such identification procedure is
authorized by this section.(2) Presence of Counsel or Other Witness. An identification
procedure is authorized by this section if(a) counsel for the arrested person is present or has con-
sented thereto;(b) counsel for the arrested person has received reason-
able notice and opportunity to be present at such
procedure, but refuses or fails to be present;
(c) counsel for the arrested person designates some other
person to be present at such procedure, and such
other person is given a reasonable opportunity to be
present;(d) the arrested person is unable to obtain counsel to rep-
resent him at such identification procedure and
there is present a lawyer specially designated (in ac-
cordance with prescribed procedures], who shall rep-
resent such person at the identification procedure;
(e) the arrested person, having been informed of his
right to be represented by counsel as provided in this
section, waives such presentation, provided that the
arrested person may designate some other person to
be present, and such other person must be given no-
tice and a reasonable opportunity to be present at
such procedure; or
(f) awaiting the presence of counsel or such other person
as the arrested person or his counsel designates is
likely to prejudice the possibility of making an iden-
tification.
(3) Required Procedures: Regulations. An identification pro-
cedure is authorized by this section only if there has been
compliance with regulations, to be issued pursuant to Sec-
tion 1.03 [of Tentative Draft No. 1), setting forth pro-
cedures designed to insure
(a) that identifications will not be erroneous or otherwise
prejudice the rights of the arrested person; and(b) that written, sound and visual records, and disinter-
ested testimony, will be available so far as necessary
to verify the conditions under which such identifica-
tion procedures were conducted.
[Note: In cases of urgent necessity, as where a witness is dying
at the scene of the crime, it should be lawful to allow an identi-
fication with only such compliance with paragraph (b) as the
circumstances permit. A provision to that effect should be in-
eluded in Article 9, which will deal generally with exclusion of
evidence. Such a provision would make admissible evidence of
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When a slight error in procedure, such as failure by the wit-
ness to sign a statement, occurs, the difficulty with a rule of pro-
cedure or statute which excludes testimony, however, becomes
apparent. Courts will be extremely reluctant to exclude testi-
mony because of a mere technicality. But by necessity a statute
or rule of procedure which attempts to delineate exact procedures
to be followed will result in technical errors by law enforcement
officials.
Another desirable alternative would be the voluntary estab-
lishment by police and attorneys of regulations which would as-
sure defendants of fair identification procedures. The regula-
tions jointly promulgated by the District Attorney and the Pub-
lic Defender's office of Clark County, Nevada have received fav-
orable comment as an example of this approach.2 24 These regu-
lations provide a police check list for lineup identifications:
1. No line-up identification should be held without dis-
cussing the legal advisability of such line-up with the office of
the District Attorney.
2. No line-up should be held without a member of the Dis-
trict Attorney's office being present.
3. No line-up should be held without a member of the Pub-
lic Defender's office* being present.
4. Insofar as possible, all persons in line-up should be of
the same general age, racial and physical characteristics (in-
cluding dress).
5. Should any body movement, gesture, or verbal state-
ment be necessary, this should also be done uniformly and
any such movement, gesture, statement should be done one
time only by each person participating in the line-up and re-
peated only at the express request of the person attempting to
make identification.
6. The customary line-up photograph should be taken, de-
veloped as soon as possible and a copy of such photograph made
available immediately to the Public Defender's office.*
7. If more than one person is called to view a line-up, the
persons should not be allowed, before the completion of all
witnesses' attempted identification, to discuss among them-
selves any facet of their view of the line-up or the result of their
conclusions regarding the same.
8. All witnesses who are to view the line-up should be pre-
vented from seeing the suspect in custody and in particular in
handcuffs, or in any manner that would indicate to the witness
the identity of the suspect in question.
an identification and evidence deriving therefrom, in cases of
urgent necessity.1
ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § A5.09 (Study Draft
No. 1, 1968).
224. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § A5.09,
comment at 32 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968).
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9. All efforts should be made to prevent a witness from
viewing any photographs of the suspect prior to giving the
line-up.
10. All conversation between the police officer and pro-
spective witnesses should be restricted to only indispensible di-
rection. In all cases nothing should be said to the witness to
suggest suspect is standing in the particular line-up.
11. Should there be any more than one witness, only one
witness at a time should be present in the room where the
line-up is conducted.
12. There should be a minimum of persons present in the
room where the line-up is conducted, and a suggested group
would be the law enforcement officer conducting the line-up,
a representative of the District Attorney's office, a representa-
tive of the Public Defender's* office and an investigator of
that office if requested by the Public Defender.
13. The line-up report prepared by the law enforcement
agency conducting the line-up should be prepared in sufficient
number of copies to make a copy available, at the line-up, to
the Public Defender.*
14. Each witness, as he appears in the room where the
line-up is conducted, should be handed a form for use in the
identification. Explanation for the use of the form is self-ex-
planatory and a sample copy is attached hereto. This form
should be signed by the witness, by a representative of the
Public Defender's office*, and by the law enforcement officer
conducting the line-up.
15. A copy of this Identification Form should be given to
the Public Defender's office* at the completion of the viewing
of the line-up by each individual witness.
* This would apply to any privately retained attorney, should
he be there in lieu of the Public Defender.22 5
This approach is, however, somewhat unrealistic. Identifica-
tion problems will be solved only when regulations are drawn
up. Some communities will eventually complete them, but oth-
ers will never do so. In those communities "fairly good" proce-
dures will still be the only protection for defendants.
Finally, the use of neutral magistrates to supervise and scru-
tinize pretrial identification has been suggested. -2 2 0  This sug-
gestion seems to provide the most flexibility for this area. By
the adoption of a rule of criminal procedure or a statute, identifi-
cation procedures, absent urgent necessity, could simply require
the presence of defense counsel and a neutral magistrate. The
standards of fairness to be used by the magistrate could then be
drafted by the offices of the Public Defender and District At-
torney in a manner similar to the regulations adopted in Clark
225. See, Comment, The Right to Counsel During Pretrial Identifi-
cation Proceedings-An Examination, 47 NE. L. REv. 740, 760 (1968).
226. Id. at 757.
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County, Nevada. The magistrate could then apply the regula-
tions as the identification procedure was occurring.
If a magistrate was not present for the identification proce-
dure because of urgent necessity or accidental confrontation and
identification, the prosecution could be required to give timely
notice to the defense of their intent to use an in-court identifica-
tion. Defense counsel could then move for a pretrial hearing to
determine the admissibility of the identification of the suspect by
the witness. The court could consider the criteria developed for
the establishment of an "independent source" in its decision at
the pretrial hearing.
Under this alternative the exact procedures for pretrial iden-
tifications would be clarified for law enforcement officials, and a
case-by-case determination by the courts of "independent source,"
"harmless error," or "totality of the circumstances" would be
unnecessary. More importantly, however, suspects would be as-
sured a pretrial identification procedure relatively free from un-
necessary suggestion, and many dangers in pretrial identification
recognized by the Court in Wade, Gilbert and Stovall would fi-
nally be removed.
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